Introduction
During the 1990s a large number of emerging and transition economies implemented profound market-oriented economic reforms. State owned enterprises were privatized, fiscal imbalances were tackled, trade barriers were lowered, and in many countries capital controls were eliminated. In the economic literature these economic policies are known, somewhat misleadingly, as the "Washington Consensus." 1 During the early stages of this process a number of authors became concerned with the "sequencing of reform."
2 They argued that the order in which markets were deregulated mattered, and that liberalizing capital restrictions too early could be very costly. Many of these analysts were worried about the effects of a premature opening of the capital account on the (real) exchange rate and on international competitiveness. In particular, they pointed out that if restrictions on capital mobility were lifted "too soon,"
the country in question would be flooded with short term capital. This would result in an appreciation of the currency and reduce profitability in the exports' sector; in some countries it could also generate a short term real estate boom. The main danger, they argued, was that this increase in capital flows would be transitory, and that at some point foreign investors (and speculators) would withdraw from the country, generating a "sudden stop" and a costly crisis.
As the 1990s unfolded a growing number of policy makers dismissed this apprehensions about sequencing. Reforms were undertaken rapidly and almost simultaneously, and many countries relaxed capital controls during the early stages of the process. For some time this strategy seemed to work, as many countries experienced an acceleration in growth. In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, however, growth was replaced by a succession of deep and traumatic crises. In December 1994, the Mexican Peso collapsed and was devalued by more than 50%. In 1997, when the emerging world was beginning to recover from Mexico's "Tequila" crisis, the East Asian crises erupted, and it was followed by the Russian devaluation in 1998 and the failure of the investment firm Long Term Capital Management. In 1999 Brazil's real was devalued; in 2000 Turkey faced an external crisis; the Argentine peso collapsed in 2001, 1 See, for example, Williamson (1990) and Rodrick (2006) . 2 See, Edwards (1990) and Funke (1993) after 10 years of one-to-one parity with the U.S. dollar; and in 2002 Uruguay went through a deep balance of payments crisis. In many of these countries -as well as in those affected by "contagion" --output declined and unemployment increased significantly.
During the early 2000s, and partially as a result of these crises, an increasing number of analysts began to criticize the Washington Consensus and the market oriented reforms. Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz was, perhaps, the most forceful of the critics.
In his 2002 book Globalization and its Discontent, Stiglitz argues that globalization policies and market reforms have the potential of doing a lot of good, if undertaken properly and if they incorporate the characteristics of each individual country. The problem, according to Stiglitz, is that globalization was not pushed carefully or fairly.
On the contrary, according to him, during the 1990s and early 2000s reform policies were implemented too fast, in the wrong sequence, and often using inadequate -or plainly wrong -economic analysis. Three interrelated policy issues were at the center of Stiglitz's and other criticisms of globalization and the Washington Consensus: (1) in designing reform packages during the 1990s, crucial aspects of the sequencing and pace of reform were ignored. As a result, in many countries reform was implemented too fast -Stiglitz prefers gradualism --, and in the wrong order. 3 (2) Advocating (and imposing) financial liberalization was a huge mistake. According to Stiglitz freer capital mobility encourages speculation and increases the probability of external crises, including sudden stops of capital inflows. And (3), the IMF involvement in the East Asian and
Argentinean crises was a disaster that made things worse rather than better. 4 In this paper I use a large cross country data set to investigate whether, as posited by some authors, an increase in the degree of financial openness affects the likelihood that a country experiences an external crisis. In particular, I investigate if a liberalization process undertaken in the "wrong order" -that is, one characterized by an early relaxation of capital controls -increases a country's vulnerability to a crisis. More specifically, I use variance component probit analysis to analyze how different variables affect the probability of countries being subject to sudden stops of capital inflows. I also consider the role played by current account and fiscal imbalances, contagion, international reserves holdings, and the exchange rate regime on the probability of an external crisis. Throughout the paper I define "crisis" as a major and abrupt decline in (net) capital inflows, or "sudden stop."
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II I discuss some policy issues related to the sequencing of economic reform. In Section III I develop an empirical model for analyzing the extent to which financial globalization and trade openness, among other variables, have affected the probability of an external crisis.
More specifically, I investigate the way in which different combinations of trade and financial openness affect the estimated probability of a sudden stop of capital inflows. In Section IV I provide some concluding remarks. There is also a Data Appendix. The paper differs from previous work on the subject --including from some of my own previous efforts --, in several respects: first, I use a new measure of the degree of financial openness constructed from data collected by the Fraser Institute since 1975.
Second, I use a data set that includes a larger number of countries and years than those used in previous works. And third, and perhaps more important, I address questions related to the effects of alternative sequencings of economic reform on macroeconomic vulnerability.
Financial and Trade Liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s: How Much?
How Fast? In which Sequence?
Trade and Financial Liberalization in the 1990s
During the 1990s and early 2000s there was an unprecedented move towards trade and financial liberalization throughout the world. Country after country reduced import tariffs and quantitative trade restrictions, and lifted controls on capital mobility. Table 1 presents data on average import tariffs -measured in percentage terms --and an index of capital mobility for 6 regions for 1985-2004, computed Edison and Warnock (2003) . Their index refers to the stock market only, and is constructed as the ratios of market capitalization of "investible" securities to total market capitalization. For an exhaustive discussion on measurement issues, including on the difficulties of providing separate long time series for inflows and outflows and a large number of countries, see Miniane (2004) ; see also the discussion and computations in Chinn and Ito (2006) . As with most measures of capital mobility, the Fraser Institute Index used in this paper and summarized in Table 1 , does not make a distinction between controls on inflows and outflows. As argued above, constructing such an index for a 5 Ideally one would also want information on non-tariff restrictions. These data, however, are difficult to find for a large number of countries and years. The Fraser Institute, for instance, has only data for some years since 1995; these shorter time series support the idea of a massive increase in the degree of trade openness.
large number of countries and a long period of time, continues to be a challenge for future research. (4) Financial reform requires the creation of modern supervisory and regulatory agencies.
The Sequencing of Liberalization
And (5), the capital account should be liberalized at the very end of the process, and only once the economy has been able to expand successfully its export sector.
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In the early 1990s the issue of speed and sequencing became central in analyses on how to design a reform strategy for the former communist countries. In discussing the problems faced by Czechoslovakia during the early period of its transition, Vaclav Klaus pointed out that one of the main problems was deciding on "sequencing as regards domestic institutional and price measures on the one hand, and liberalization of foreign trade and rate of exchange on the other" (Klaus, 1990, page 18 (Guitián, 1995 p. 85-86) ."
In the mid 1990s the U.S. government began pressuring the East Asian nations to liberalize their financial account restrictions and to allow capital to move more freely.
Policy makers and academics in most of the Asia became extremely concerned about these recommendations. They raised two main issues: On the one hand, they argued that -as had been the case in a number of Latin American countries during the early 1980s -liberalizing the financial account would result in massive real exchange rate appreciation.
This was against the decades-old policy of maintaining a highly competitive real exchange rate as a way of encouraging exports. The second concern was based on a vulnerability argument: an open financial account could make the East Asian nations more vulnerable to abrupt declines in capital inflows. If this were to happen, the region would incur in severe adjustment costs and high unemployment, and could even end up with a smaller export sector.
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The sequencing of reform discussion may be illustrated with the assistance of Table 2 , where there are four combinations of financial and trade integration with the rest of the world. The conventional "trade liberalization first" sequencing is given by a (gradual) move from Box 1, to Box 2, and eventually to Box 3:
The "early financial integration" sequence, which has been criticized by Stiglitz and others, has two variants. The "financial liberalization" first mode:
7 See, for example, Park and Park (1995) .
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The second variant corresponds to a faster and simultaneous trade and financial opening:
Notice that Box 4 in Table 2 -a box characterized by a low degree of openness to trade in goods and a high degree of financial openness -characterizes the main features of the "capital account first" liberalization process. Another way of putting it is that countries that followed the "conventional wisdom" sequencing of opening trade in goods first and delaying financial openness, will never find themselves in Box 4. Table 2 , these countries are in Box 4, a box that belongs to the criticized "early financial reform" sequencing.
Many of the Latin American countries that suffered major external crises during the 1990s and 2000s -including Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay -had opened their financial accounts early and rapidly. This contrasted with the case of Chile and Colombia, two countries that maintained some controls on capital flows -and in 8 In order to be in this list a country has to have had, at least for one year, trade and financial indicators in excess of the thresholds presented above.
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particular on capital inflows --and did not default on their debts during the 1980s. 9 An interesting question, and one that I address in Section III of this paper, is whether countries whose policies are characterized by Box 4 in Table 2 have faced a higher probability of experiencing a sudden stop of capital inflows than countries with other configurations of capital and financial openness.
Globalization, Sequencing and Crises: An Empirical Investigation
In this Section I investigate whether the degree of globalization affects the probability of a country experiencing a sudden stop of capital inflows. I am particularly interested in analyzing the way in which alternative combinations of financial and trade openness affect the likelihood of a sudden-stops crisis. This analysis will shed some light on the sequencing of reform debate, as well as on the validity of some of the criticisms of the so-called Washington Consensus. I am also interested in investigating the way in which capital mobility affects the role played by other variables -including external imbalances and the degree of flexibility of the nominal exchange rate -in determining the probability of a sudden stop.
The Empirical Model
The point of departure is a variance component probit model given by equations
(1) and (2): . In addition to the random effects model, I also estimated fixed effects and basic probit versions of the probit model in equations (1) and (2). 
Specification and Variable Definition
I define a "sudden stop" episode as an abrupt and major reduction in net capital inflows to a country that, up to that time, had been receiving large volumes of foreign capital. More specifically, I imposed the following requirements for an episode to qualify as a "sudden stop" crisis: (1) the country must have received an inflow of capital (relative to GDP) larger than its region's third quartile during the two years prior to the "sudden stop." That is, prior to the sudden stop incident the country in question must have been a high recipient of foreign capital. And (2), net capital inflows must have declined by at least 3% of GDP in one year. Table 3 contains data on the incidence of sudden stops for the period 1970-2004 for six regions as well as for the world as a whole.
In the econometric analysis I use a one year window, where data for the year following a sudden stop episode are set as "missing." The main purpose of this window is to avoid double counting sudden stop episodes that are stretched over multiple years. However, when the analysis was performed on the raw data, without a window, the results were similar to those reported here (See Section 3.6 for details). 10 In the "basic probit" estimation, the error term is assumed to have the standard characteristics.
In specifying the model I follow the literature on external crises, devaluations, sudden stops, and current account reversals. 11 In the base-case specification I included the following covariates, all of which are available for a large number of countries and years:
• The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP, lagged one period. This allows me to investigate whether the "current account matters" when it comes to crises.
• The lagged ratio of the country's fiscal deficit relative to GDP.
• The lagged value of an index that measures "contagion." This index is defined as the relative occurrence of a contraction in capital flows in each country's "reference group." The reference group, in turn, is defined for most countries as their region. As in Table 3 there are five geographical regions:
Latin America, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, Africa and Eastern and Central Europe. The advanced countries belong to a group of their own.
In this calculation data for the country in question are excluded. The coefficient of this "contagion" variable in the probit equation is expected to be positive, reflecting the fact that when a similar country experiences a capital flow contraction, capital flows to the country in question will tend to decline, increasing the likelihood of a sudden stop.
• Percentage change in the terms of trade (defined as the ratio of export prices to import prices), with a one year lag. Improved terms of trade are expected to lower the probability of a crisis; its coefficient should be negative.
• Lagged international real interest rates, proxied by real U.S. 10 year Treasuries. As Eichengreen (2001) has argued, a decline in world liquiditycaptured by higher international real interest rates -will tend to increase the probability of an external crisis. If this is indeed the case, the coefficient of this variable will be positive.
• A dummy variable for each region. In some of the regressions, instead of the regional dummies I included dummy variables for advanced countries.
• A dummy variable that takes the value of one if that particular country has a de facto flexible exchange rate regime, and zero otherwise. The classification of exchange rate regimes is taken from the updated data set developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) .
• International reserves as a proportion of the country's total external liabilities.
This indicator was constructed from data provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) . To the extent that a high level of international reserves held by the central bank is seen as an insurance policy, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative in the estimation of the probit equations.
As a way of capturing alternative openness scenarios, I included the following variables into the probit analysis:
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• A variable that measures whether the financial account is open. This variable, which I call Cap_Open, takes the value of one if in any given year a financial openness index constructed on the bases of the Fraser Institute indicator takes a value equal or higher than 6, in a scale from 1 to 10. This value of 6 corresponds to the 25 th percentile of the financial openness index.
• In Sub-Section 3.6, on extensions, I report and discuss results obtained when additional covariates, including the degree of dollarization of the economy and liabilities mismatches in the banking sector, are included in the analysis.
Basic Results
The basic results from the probit estimates are presented in Tables 4, where as customary, I report the marginal effects of each independent variable on the probability of a sudden stop, evaluated at the mean values of the covariates. For presentation purposes in this Table I don't present the marginal effects of the regional dummies; none of them, however, was significant, indicating that once economics variables are taken into account, regional or geographical considerations don't play an important role. At the bottom of each column I also present the estimated probability of a sudden stop, also evaluated at the mean values of the covariates. This is an important variable, which will become the center of much of the analysis that follows.
As may be seen, most estimated coefficients have the expected signs and the majority of them are significant at conventional levels. The following aspects of the results are worth discussing: (a) countries with large (lagged) current account deficits face a higher probability of a crisis. The point estimate of the marginal effect of the (lagged) current account deficit is rather small, however--about one half of one percent. in Table 4 suggests that after controlling for the current account deficit, the public sector deficit plays no role in determining the likelihood of a crisis. However, as may be seen in column (4.2), once the current account variable is excluded, the public sector deficits have a positive effect on the probability. That is, a marginal increase in the government deficit that is not reflected in an external (current account) imbalance has no effect on the probability of a crisis. (f) Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, with other things given, neither changes in the terms of trade nor the stock of international reserves appear to affect the likelihood of a sudden stop.
From this paper's perspective the most important results are related to the coefficients of the two openness variables. As may be seen, the coefficient of the financial openness dummy is significantly positive in the three regressions; moreover, the point estimates of the marginal effects are rather large, suggesting that with other variables given (and at their mean values), moving from a "closed" to an "open" financial account increases the probability of a sudden stop by approximately 4 percentage points.
The results in Table 4 also show that the coefficient of the trade openness variable is always positive; the values of the z-statistics, however, are low. Only in one of the three regressions they exceed one, and in none of them they are significant at the 10% level.
Aizenman and Noy (2004) The results reported at the bottom of Table 4 show that, when all the covariates are at their mean values, the estimated probabilities of a sudden stop are on the low side, ranging from 3.2% to 4.2%. In the Sub-Sections that follow I investigate how these estimated probabilities -and the marginal effects -change when the probability functions are evaluated at alternative values of the covariates and, in particular, when they are evaluated for different configurations of trade and financial openness.
Probabilities of Sudden Stops under Alternative Configurations of Trade and Financial Openness: A Preliminary Exercise on the Sequencing issue
An important property of probit models is that marginal effects and estimated probabilities are conditional on the values of all covariates. This means that if the value of one of the independent variables changes, the overall estimated probability-and of, the estimated marginal effect of all covariates for that matter --will also change.
Denoting the (normal) cumulative probability distribution by Φ , the probit model is defined by: 
In order to provide some insights into the sequencing issue, I use the estimates from column (4.3) in Table 4 to compute the probabilities of experiencing a sudden stop for the four configurations of financial and trade openness that appear in Table 2 (in performing this exercise the values of the other covariates have been maintained at their means). 13 That is, in terms of equation (3) above, I consider four alternative vectors ω in the computation of the overall estimated probabilities presented in Table 5 . Each of these four vectors corresponds to a different combination of trade openness and financial openness. For example, the estimates for the "Closed Trade Account -Close Financial Account" box (with a calculated probability of a sudden stop of 0.022) was estimated by evaluating equation (3) when the Cap_Open variable takes a value of zero, and the Trade_Open variable also takes a value of zero; in this calculation all other covariates take their mean value. Likewise, the estimated probability "Closed Trade AccountOpen Financial Account" box (0.068) was obtained by evaluating equation (3) The results obtained for the estimated overall probabilities of a sudden stop crisis are presented in Table 5 , where robust standard errors were used to compute the zstatistics. A first reaction to these computations is that in all four possible combinations of trade and financial openness the estimated probabilities are on the low side. Even in the highest case the estimated probability is lower than 0.10. Second, and as expected from the estimates reported above, these results show that the highest probability of facing a sudden stop is obtained when both the trade and financial accounts are open. This result, however, has to be interpreted with caution, for at least two reasons: First, the coefficients of the trade openness indicator in the probit equations were estimated in a rather imprecise way (the z-statistic for the trade openness variable in column (4.3).
Second, the probability estimates in Table 5 were obtained by evaluating the probability function at the mean values of all other covariates. This, however, is a somewhat artificial exercise, as it is highly unlikely that countries that have very different configurations of trade and financial openness -and/or follow different sequences of reform --, will face the same values of other covariates. Indeed, the concern about the "financial liberalization first" sequence is that it will result in a very large and unsustainable current account deficit; moreover, it has been argued that this sequence is particularly risky in the presence of pegged exchange rates. In the Sub-Section that follows I address this issue by evaluating the sudden stop probability function under two alternative scenarios that include different current account deficits and exchange rate regimes.
The Role of Current Account Imbalances and the Exchange Rate Regime in the Sequencing Debate
Authors that favor a gradual liberalization course, where the financial account is opened towards the end of the process, and only after trade liberalization has been consolidated, have argued that that particular sequence avoids very large current account deficits. 14 Moreover, and as pointed out above, critics of early financial liberalization have been particularly concerned about the rigidities imposed by fixed exchange rates. rate regime. (For the actual methodology used, remember the discussion on equations (3) and (4), and the explanation on how the results in Table 5 were obtained). The two cases under consideration are:
• Scenario A: A country with a fixed exchange rate regime moves from a "closed-closed" situation to an "open financial-closed trade" configuration; that is, it moves from Box 1 to Box 4 in Table 2 . In addition, I assume that in the process of opening up financially the country develops a large current account deficit (8% of GDP). In that regard, in this scenario the estimated probability of a crisis is computed by evaluating the probit function when the flexible exchange rate dummy takes a value of zero, and the current account variable takes a value of 0.08. This scenario, then, reflects a "financial liberalization first" sequencing that is accompanied by the development of a large current account imbalance, under fixed exchange rates.
• Scenario B: Gradual transition from a "closed-closed" configuration to an
"open-open" one. I further assume that during the liberalization process the country adopts a flexible exchange rate regime and that, due to the gradualism of the process, it is able to maintain the current account deficit at "reasonable" levels (3.5% of GDP). This means that in this scenario the estimated probability of a crisis is estimated by evaluating the probability function in equation (3) when the flexible exchange rate dummy takes a value of one, and the current account variable takes a value of 0.035. In terms of Table 2 , this scenario corresponds to a gradual move from Box 1 to Box 3.
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I use the estimates from column (4.3) in Table 4 for evaluating the probabilities under these two scenarios. Under both Scenarios A and B the initial conditions are characterized by closed trade and financial accounts. As may be seen from Table 5 , in 15 The "gradualism" aspect of this scenario is built into the assumption that the current account deficit doesn't explode, and remains within sustainable levels. This is indeed a feature of gradual liberalizations (see Edwards, 2002). this case the estimated probability of a sudden stop crisis is 0.022. The estimated probabilities of experiencing a sudden stop crisis under the two alternative sequencing Scenarios described above are:
• Scenario A (abrupt "financial account first" strategy): Estimated probability of experiencing a sudden stop: 0.133.
• Scenario B (gradual "financial account last" strategy): Estimated probability of a sudden stop: 0.062.
As may be seen, under both scenarios the overall estimated probability of a sudden stop increases relative to the "closed-closed" initial condition. However, it increases significantly more (from 0.022 to 0.133) under Scenario A than under Scenario B (from 0.022 to 0.062). These results suggest, quite strongly, that both the exchange rate regime and the evolution of the current account deficit are key variables for determining the likelihood of a capital inflows crunch. In particular, maintaining the current account deficit within limits during a reform process reduces a country's vulnerability very significantly. Likewise, adopting a flexible rates regime reduces the risks of a crisis in an important way.
Another important result is that according to this exercise, under Scenario A the country in question is more vulnerable to external shocks than under Scenario B.
16 For example, the marginal effect of world real interest rates shocks is twice as large under Scenario A as under Scenario B: 0.014 vs 0.007. Notice, however, that under both scenarios these probabilities are still low in absolute terms.
Extensions, Robustness, Instrumental Variables, and Future Work
In this section I investigate the robustness of the results and I discuss directions for future research. I also present results obtained using instrumental variables probit estimates. In dealing with robustness I focus on the definition of both the sudden stop indicator and of the openness indexes. 16 The marginal effects under these alternative Scenarios are not reported fully due to space considerations. However, they are available from the author on request.
Extensions and Robustness:
The results reported above were obtained when the sudden stops indicator was defined using a one year window. This means that the observation corresponding to the year immediately following a sudden stop episode was set as missing. However, one could alternatively define the episodes without using a window. The results obtained when this is done are presented in column 1 of Table 6 , where as before I report the marginal effects (as in previous Tables, and due to space considerations, I don't show those for the regional dummies; once more, however, none of them was significant). As may be seen, the estimated marginal effects are not very different from those discussed above and presented in Table 4 ; moreover, the overall message from the previous results is maintained. values of all covariates -is very small: a unitary increase in the financial openness index raises the probability of a sudden stop by less than one tenth of one percent.
In order to explore further the role of trade openness, I replaced the tariffs-based indicator with the more traditional "exports plus imports, over GDP" ratio. The results obtained are in column 4, Table 6 . As may be seen, these results strengthened our previous findings. Notice that the overall predicted probability continues to be very low.
Some authors have argued that the extent of dollarization of an economyincluding mismatches between dollar denominated assets and liabilities in the banking and corporate sectors --, play an important role in determining its vulnerability to crises.
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In order to investigate this issue I added two dollarization-related variables to the estimation (a shortcoming of this exercise, however, is that the dollarization data are available for a relatively smaller set of countries): (a) the ratio dollarized deposits to total deposits in the banking sector. This variable is called Dollar_Deposits, and was obtained from Levy-Yeyati (2006) . And, (b) an index of currency mismatches constructed by Eichengreen et al (2005) . This index, however, is not available as a time series. In the results reported below I make the assumption that countries had the same degree of The results obtained are in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 . As may be seen, the coefficients of these dollarization-related variables are not significant at conventional levels. This suggests that, with other things given, the degree of dollarization does not affect in an important way a country's vulnerability to a sudden stop. It is important to notice, however, that this does not mean that dollarization plays no role in crisis episodes.
Indeed, it is possible that the costs associated with sudden stop crises are higher in dollarized nations. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instrumental Variables:
It is possible, although in my view unlikely, that the analysis presented in the preceding sections is subject to endogeneity. In particular, under certain circumstances capital restrictions (and maybe, even trade restrictions) may be increased as a result of the perception that a sudden stop will occur in the future. In order to address this potential endogeneity issue I estimated the probit model using 17 See, for example, Eichengreen et al. (2005) . maximum likelihood instrumental variables procedure suggested by Amemiya (1978) .
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In this estimation I used the two continuous indexes of openness (Tariff and Financial Op) used in the estimation of column (6.3) in Table 6 . calculated using a gravity model. 20 The results obtained from the instrumental variables probit estimates are reported in Table 7 . The results obtained generally support the findings on the effects of financial openness on the probability of a sudden stop. The covariates have the expected signs and most are significant. The most important result from this paper's perspective is that the coefficient of financial openness is, as in the previously reported estimates, significantly positive; moreover, its point estimate is similar to that obtained when no correction for potential endogeneity was made. On the other hand, in the instrumental variables estimation the coefficient of Tariff is not significant at conventional levels.
Future Work: The analysis presented above has relied on the nonlinear properties of probits to investigate the way in which different variables -including the degree of trade and financial openness, the exchange rate regime and current account imbalancesinteract to determine the probability of a country experiencing a sudden and abrupt decline in capital inflows. An alternative way to deal with this issue -and one that is 18 The identifying restriction is that the number of instruments excluded from the main equation is equal or greater than the number of endogenous variables. 19 The estimation of IV probits when the endogenous variables are binary is extremely complex. For this reason in this paper I used the continuous indicators discussed above. 20 As Aizenman and Noy (2004) have shown, there is a strong empirical connection between trade openness and the degree of capital mobility. The use of gravity trade equations to generate instruments in panel estimation has been pioneered by Jeff Frankel. See, for example, Frankel and Cavallo (2004) .
beyond the scope of this paper -is to introduce in the estimation terms that interact two or more covariates. This specification would provide information on the cross effect of one of the covariates on the probability of a sudden stop. 21 Future work on the subject could indeed investigate the nature of these interactive terms and cross effects.
Additionally, future work should focus on trying to determine whether different forms of financial restrictions affect the probability of a crisis in different ways. As pointed out above, a particularly interesting question is whether controls on capital inflows and controls on outflows have the same effect on the probability of a crisis.
Other promising avenues for future work include devising alternative ways of depicting different sequencing scenarios. The approach taken in this paper provides interesting insights, but it is not based on a fully dynamic analysis where different sequences can be identified sharply. Moving in this direction would require constructing new openness indexes that would capture the interplay between trade and financial openness. This would be extremely useful, as it would help policy makers understand the way in which the interplay between trade and capital account openness affect vulnerability. As pointed out earlier, another area of future research is constructing indexes of financial integration that differentiate between controls on outflows and inflows for a large number of countries over many years.
The results reported above deal with the effects of alternative degrees of openness on the probability of a sudden stop crisis. An important question -and one that complements the analysis presented here -has to do with the costs faced by a country once a crisis erupts. In particular, are these costs similar in countries that have followed alternative opening strategies? Or, are theses costs different for countries that followed different liberalization sequences? These important questions are beyond the scope of the current paper.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper I used panel probit and a large cross country data set to investigate whether an increase in the degree of openness -both trade and financial -affects the probability of external crises. I was particularly interested in investigating the way in which the interaction between openness in the trade and capital accounts -the so-called 21 See Edwards (2007a) for an application to external crises.
sequencing of reform --affect these probabilities. I also focused on potential roles of current account and fiscal imbalances, contagion, international reserves holdings, and the exchange rate regime as possible determinants of external crises. In the analysis I used new measures of capital account and trade restrictions developed by the Fraser Institute.
A main objective of this work is trying to determine whether rapid reforms that open the financial account early on increase a country's degree of vulnerability to crises. The results reported in the preceding pages provide some (preliminary) evidence suggesting that "financial liberalization first" strategies increase the degree of vulnerability to crises. This is particularly the case if these strategies are pursued with pegged exchange rates and if they result in large current account imbalances. Although these results should be interpreted with caution -in particular due to the imperfect nature of the index of capital mobility --, they do support the view that "sequencing matters," a view expressed early on by McKinnon (1973) and Edwards (1984) , and more recently by Stiglitz (2002) .
Finally, it is important to emphasize that this paper has dealt with only one aspect of policies aimed at opening an economy. Indeed, I have not addressed issues related to the effects of financial and/or trade liberalization on total factor productivity growth, aggregate growth and/or welfare. At this time, however, there is a considerable body of empirical evidence suggesting that countries that are more open to international trade experience faster total factor productivity growth than countries that restrict trade.
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Whether this is a long term effect, or one that eventually dies off is still the subject of some discussion. There is also evidence that more open economies are able to adjust more rapidly -and less costly -to external shocks. 23 The evidence on the effects of financial openness on growth and overall economic performance, however, is not that clear cut. A challenge for future research is to develop a unified empirical framework that considers the simultaneous effects of financial and trade openness -and the sequencing of reform --, including the effects on growth, welfare and vulnerability to crises.
22 Edwards (1998) . 23 Calvo et al (2004) , Edwards (2004) . Note: Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.. Regional dummies included, but not reported. Note: Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Regional dummies included, but not reported. Note: Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. For the list of instruments, see the text. Regional dummies included, but not reported. 
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